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OFFICERS, FACULTY, STAFF AND WIVES are 
invited to contribute articles of interest 
to the BAROMETER, c/o The Editor. 
"No change that might improve even minutely the level of talent in our naval forces 
should be overlooked. We must remember always that the basic element of strength in any 
nation is not in its machines but in-its manhood." 
Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy 
COST EFFECTIVENESS - One Manis Opinion 
A large number of the students here at NPS are devoting a great amount of their time 
to a consideration of methods in which scientific principles can be brought to bear on 
naval problems. One of the principal methods under consideration is that of evaluating 
various alternatives by applying cost-effectiveness principles. An outgrowth of the 
McNamara-Hitch era, the great emphasis on cost effectiveness has been the subject of 
much controversy, and it probably will continue to be a heated issue as long as it is 
advocated as a "necessary" part of the DOD decision process. 
The following quotation is taken from testimony by VADM RICKOVER on Cost Effectiveness 
and the Nuclear Navy before the House Armed Services Committee. It can serve as a 
reminder that cost effectiveness may be used as one tool with which to attempt to arrive 
at better estimates of varying alternatives. Not the final solution, just a tool! Something 
is needed, but this is not always the answer. 
The cost-effectiveness people have created the illusion that they are capable 
of relating cost to military effectiveness by scientific analysis. In actual fact, 
they are just as reluctant to change preconceived opinions as they accuse the military 
of being. Knowledge of an esoteric mathematical ability does not of itself insure 
wisdom or judgment. The issue of nuclear power has amply demonstrated this •••• 
The basis for using cost-effectiveness studies as the rationale on which to 
make a decision is the assumption that the important factors can be expressed in 
numerical form and that a correct judgm~t of the situation can then be calculated 
mathemetically. But for most complex situations this is an unrealistic assumption. 
Frankly, I have rto more faith in the ability of the social scientists to quantify 
military effectiveness than I do in numerologists to calculate the future. 
Many people are mesmerized into believing that a study which is based on computer 
calculations must be correct since it uses the most modern mathematical techniques. 
They are led to believe that the results are equivalent to scientific proof. This, 
of course, is just not so. 
I daily face difficult scientific and engineering problems, the resolution of 
which requires melding together experience, intuition, judgment, and experimental 
testing, as well as the results of complex computer calculations. In my technical 
work one of the most important issues I face is the determination of those things 
which are properly subject to numerical analysis and those things which are not. Any 
mathematical calculation can only produce results within the framework of the 
assumptions upon which the calculation is based and even within this framework 
is only as accurate as the numbers assigned to the various factors involved. 
The calculation results cannot take into consideration factors which are eliminated 
by the original assumptions. Faulty assumptions will produce faulty answers. 
Incorrect data will produce incorrect results. 
Because of the highly developmental nature of naval nuclear propulsion work, 
we have in our laboratories the most advanced computers available in the world today. 
To carry out this complex technical work, we utilize the talents of a large number 
of mathematicians, scientists, and engineers of the first rank. But I want to 
emphasize the point that whether numerical calculations are done by hand or on a 
computer which can perform approximately a million operations per second, the 
numerical answer will be the same -- the difference is the length of time it takes 
to complete the results. No matter how advanced a method of calculation is used, 
the numerical answer cannot be any more accurate than the assumptions on which the 
calculation was based and the accuracy of the data available for inputs to the 
calculation. 
In my work, hardly a day goes by without experience in our test programs and 
operating plants revealing that the results of many of our computer studies are not 
correct; had we based our engineering decisions solely on the computer study results, 
our nuclear powerplants would not work. 
In my opinion, the ability of the social scientists to calculate numerical 
values for military effectiveness is even less than our ability to calculate a 
numerical basis for many of the engineering decisions we are forced to base on 
judgment, experience, and intuition. To make the correct engineering decisions 
requires extensive knowledge and experience in engineering. Mathematical ability 
alone will not suffice. 
WAR COLLEGE COMMENTS 
In Z-Gram 62 the Chief of Naval Operations asked the president of the Naval War 
College to convene two forums, one in the senior and one in the junior courses at the 
War College, to study the problems which confront the present-day Navy, especially in 
the area of command appeal. The results of the surveys of students were coordinated 
by the members of the two forums and then presented to CNO and the Secretary of the Navy. 
Later these summaries were printed in the September 1971 issue of Naval War College 
Review. The first of the two commentaries is reprinted here (with the permission of 
the Review) for the benefit of the BAROMETER readers and the second will be reprinted 
next~ There are many interesting comments contained in these articles and reader 
reactions to these papers are invited. 
A RESPONSE TO Z-GRAM 62 
College of Naval Command and Staff Report 
Edited by Commander Theodore R. Swartz, U. S. Navy 
Forum Member 
While this forum identified the broad areas of personnel and material as the 
main concern of today's Navy, it will direct its attention to the personnel problem. 
Discussion of material will be limited to the problem areas that have the greatest 
impact on the Navy's personnel ills. Our objective is to focus on personnel 
afflictions, offer some recommended solutions, and suggest methods for their 
implementation. 
Our Navy personnel shortcomings can be summed up in three statements: 
- Difficulty in recruiting motivated and trainable volunteers that could be 
further aggravated by the all volunteer force concept. 
- Severely reduced effectiveness of assigned personnel. 
- An unacceptable retention rate. 
This forum proposes that the Navy's emphasis be placed on recruitment, 
effectiveness. and retention. We maintain that the individual must be reasonably 
satisfied to be effective and, therefore, have concentrated on the need for increasing 
the satisfaction of in-service personnel. 
The survey conducted at the College of Naval Command and Staff, as analyzed by 
this forum, indicated that the lack of job satisfaction was the single most important 
cause of poor retention. The second greatest cause was pay. It is significant that 
most of the officers who listed pay as an important factor causing dissatisfaction 
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also specified that it was insufficient for the hours worked and responsibility of 
the job involved. In other words, factors which contribute to the lack of job 
satisfaction were given as reasons for demanding more money. While not diminishing 
the need for more pay, a major portion of the Command and Staff students supported 
increased job satisfaction, in some form, as a partial solution.* The individual 
must be satisfied with the Navy in order for the Navy to be satisfied with the 
individual. When this balance is brought about, recruitment and retention should 
measurably improve. 
The satisfaction of personnel can be viewed in two distinct but related areas: 
- Insufficient knowledge about handling and managing people. We have termed 
this the "psychic income problem." 
- An overcommitted Navy, which results in a "deficit management dilemma." 
Psychic income is defined as "those factors which enable the individual to feel 
fulfilled"; that is, his needs are satisfied, and he can see his goals being obtained 
through his participation within the group. Not providing this psychic income seems 
to be the root source of toe collective ills which result in dissatisfaction among 
Navymen. The basic human need to feel fulfillment can be thought of as being divided 
into social and ego needs. 
The social needs are characterized by a desire for belonging, for association, 
for giving and receiving friendship, and for acceptance by one's contemporaries. 
Research has shown that men being transferred often, or merely under the threat of 
being unexpectedly transferred, do not identify with or join groups. As a result 
their basic social needs go unsatisfied, an "esprit de corps" does not exist, and, 
in the case of the Navy, combat effectiveness is markedly reduced. As related to 
the contemporary scene, the personnel instability which is so prevalent in the fleet 
is counterproductive to the social needs of Navymen and reduces the combat readiness 
of Navy units. 
Man's ego needs are related to self-esteem and reputation. Self-esteem is 
enhanced by achievement, competence, knowledge, and self-confidence. His reputation 
is enhanced by status, prestige, recognition, and appreciation and the deserved 
respect of others. The ego needs of Navymen are not being reasonably satisfied just 
as their social needs are not. Our people are getting away from the ship and squadron 
environment in order to achieve psychological fulfillment. 
We submit that lack of psychological need satisfaction is one of the major 
problems we have in the Navy today. If we as leaders and managers, are unable to 
prove and demonstrate to our people that they are important and essential to their 
units, capable and dependable enough to have some freedom in carrying out their 
responsibilities and deserving of the trust and confidence of their superiors, then 
we cannot expect them to have job satisfaction. 
The second area that relates to personnel is in the organizational field, the 
deficit management dilemma. We define this term as attempting to do too much with 
too little, and we will initially relate it to our people. 
It is time to stand up and admit that we cannot satisfactorily perform all tasks 
with the limited personnel and material resources available. We understand that 
it is necessary to assign priorities within these resources. Attempting to do too 
much with too little is deficit management, and this "can do" attitude has affected 
too many areas and is a major contributing factor in redUCing job satisfaction. 
The "can do" attitude requires more attention. Originally conceived, this 
attitude expressed the ability to accomplish difficult tasks under arduous circum-
stances. While this might be commendable on a short-term basis, it appears to us 
that the now common "can do" attitude has been prostituted to mean that we make up 
with increased personal input for all the deficiencies in human and material resources 
which exist. Worse yet, this has now become a daily evolution and is better stated 
"make do." 
The reactions that these shortages in psychic income and management evoke are 
many but include lack of group identification, lack of motivation, frustration, 
disenchantment with leaders, disenchantment with career potential, and fostering of a 
"what's in it for me" attitude at all levels. The results of the combination of these 
reactions and attitudes are measurable in terms of: 
*"Although money has only l1m1ted value in satisfying many higher level needs, 
it can become the focua of iDter .. t if it is the only means available." 
--Professor Douglas McGregor, ~T. 
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Excessive supervision by many superiors who realize that assigned tasks are 
not attainable. 
- Dilution of integrity of officers and men who cannot, or will not, tell it 
as it is. 
Blind adherence to unattainable objectives in the face of insurmountable 
deficits in resources. 
- Loss of professional expertise, as Navymen spend more time in efforts directed 
toward overcoming resource deficiencies rather than the primary mission, over-
coming the enemy. 
- Loss of command appeal. 
~ You will note that the problems associated with psychic income and deficit 
management all add up to the measure we cal1 job satisfaction. It can be either 
positive or negative. There are, of course, other factors present, but according to 
the survey of Command and Staff students, this aspect seems primary. The ramifica-
tions of poor, nonexistent, or negative job satisfaction result in a wide variety 
of effects, but the most important of these is reduced combat readiness. 
To solve organizationally induced problems relating to job satisfaction, we 
must establish a natural, complete, logical growth training philosophy. As basic 
requirements the Navy should: 
- Ensure complete overhaul, modification, or repair of weapons platforms prior 
to commencement of the training cycle. In essence, support and material 
activities should not interfere with the operational training cycle. 
- Provide a minimum of 6 months training or buildup time prior to employment 
of a unit. 
- Implement an enlisted distribution policy that emphasizes crew stability 
through a Tour Completion Date concept, similar to the SSBN manning program. 
- Ensure that required personnel are on board prior to commencement of 
training cycle. 
- Establish the policy not to transfer crewmembers because of advancement in 
rate or acquisition of Navy Enlisted Code (NEC); adhere to Tour Completion 
Date and to crew stability. 
- Implement an officer rotation policy, including commanding officers, that 
matches the previously outlined Tour Completion Date policy. 
- In reference to the level distribution concept in personnel assignment, less 
than 100 percent manning is not desirable but is acceptable, provided crew 
stability is ensured. 
- Ensure that all weapons, equipment, and required spares are on board prior 
to commencement of training cycle. 
Provide real opposition in fleet exercises in order to truly evaluate all 
systems. This implies conceptualizing a valid threat and training to meet 
that threat. 
~ In summary, the growth training philosophy if adopted will allow development of 
both individual and unit effectiveness and will provide the operational commander 
a.d'''qu2.te tiwe and resources to prepare for his primary objective -- a high state of 
combat i:eadiness. 
Another organizationally induced problem indicated by a strong majority of the 
Command and Staff class was the dilution of command authority. This phenomenon 
occurs for two basic reasons. First, insufficient resources resulting in unattainable 
goals, directly contributing to overmanagement by many seniors "Tho realize that 
assignect i."'bjecti,res l'lre not possible. Rather than protesting upv7ard, they tend to 
harass enG oversu~ervise their subordinates. refusing to admit failure. This is 
termed "excessive- guidance and superyision." A realistic appraiRal of resources at 
all l evels is necessary to correct this phenomenon. And secondly, excessive admin-
:i.stt'ativG controls caused by the later<ll expansion of command levels. In order to 
correct this deficiency, we recommend a critical reuiew of ex.isting chain of command 
structures at all le,rels, v7ith the objective of eliminating redundancy and lateral 
controls. Combining administrative, operational, 2Lld sunp;rt lines into a vertical 
command line would make the individual commanding office~ ' accountable to fewer 
supericrR, preferably only one. 
L 
-~ 
Addressing the area of problems relating to individuals, we find that the Navy 
has lost a degree of effectiveness in the organization and the satisfaction of our 
people because we have not followed established principles of leadership and the 
chain of command. There is a dilution of responsibility and authority existing at 
many levels, and what is needed is the restoration of authority and accountability 
to the person who has the assigned responsibility -- in the case of handling men, the 
immediate superior. 
We recommend the institution of leadership training programs based on the 
integration of behavioral science techniques with the traditional concepts of authority, 
responsibility, and accountability -- including also the importance of evaluation, 
recognition, and reward. 
Another expressed concern which falls into both defined problem areas is that of 
development of prospective commanding officers. The problem might be stated: Does 
the Navy train and develop the commanding officer properly in basic managerial as 
well as technical specialty skills, technical specialty referring here to piloting 
an aircraft or conning a ship or submarine. Our conclusion is no. Some examples: 
an aviation lieutenant commander who has excelled in the operations department of his 
squadron and is retained there for his tour and, therefore, is not exposed to handling 
men; a surface lieutenant commander who has, by assignment, been denied the opportunity 
to develop his shiphand1ing skills; nuclear submarine engineers who readily become 
XO's and CO's. These distinct deficiencies are likely to be glossed over by the 
reporting senior because of the officer's superior performance in the billet assigned. 
This dilutes the validity and adds to this distortion of the fitness report system 
and any consequent selection based on it. These types of officers are not ready for 
command because of the lack of managerial training or technical expertise, or both. 
We consider that present schools-are inadequate to provide all officers with the 
required managerial training. To correct these deficiencies we recommend that: 
- All junior officers be trained in all basic management skills, to include the 
awareness of human behavioral patterns and current socioeconomic trends. This 
training should take place before he is placed in a managing position -- junior 
officers should be graduates of a division officer management course before 
becoming a division officer. 
- All officers be provided continuing training in management concepts relating 
to their level of responsibility. The officer should be a graduate of a 
department head course, XO course, or CO course before assuming that job. 
- A philosophy of practical development of managerial and technical skill should 
be emphasized at the unit commander level to further prepare the prospective 
commanding officer. 
To improve methods of evaluation and implementation of recommendations, the Navy 
should put the fitness report and evaluation reports in the hands of the immediate 
superior; it should be signed by him and forwarded via the commanding officer for 
amplifying remarks by endorsement. -
The report should be revised to provide different forms and grading criteria 
according to the level of job responsibility. For example, separate forms should be 
designed for division officer, department head, executive officer, commanding officer, 
staff officer. 
This revised form should include guidance on the performance standards desired by 
SecNav and CNO; that is to say, the fitness report should be utilized as both a 
performance guide and an evaluation tool. Additional grading standards should be 
~~~~~: ' 
- Protects subordinates from outside interference. 
- Accepts responsibility for subordinates' actions. 
- Displays loyalty toward superiors and subordinates. 
- Plans effectively to avoid management crises. 
- Is respected by his subordinates. 
- Establishes realistic demands and provides resources to accomplish the mission. 
In conclusion, our forum believes we must recruit, satisfy, and retain high-
caliber individuals. We have focused attention on the second of these which, we feel, 
most directly affects the overall readiness of the Navy. We have described the 
satisfaction problem in two areas -- psychic income, as relates to the individual, and 
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the organizational function we define as deficit management. The elimination of the 
psychic income problem will be a complex task. It cannot be accomplished with a 
General Order No. 2l-type approach. It will require a change in attitude by many 
leaders and the implementation of an active, thorough plan to increase our effec-
tiveness in handling and managing people. We need to demonstrate to them that they 
are the vital resource. It is our contention that if you satisfy the man, his 
resultant efforts will satisfy the Navy, and the consequent effectiveness will make 
for combat-ready units. We must stress leadership and management in terms of 
responsibility, authority, and accountability. 
It is also necessary that we work to solve the deficit management problem and 
avoid crisis management in the execution of our plans. 
We have purposely avoided a point-by-point analysis of Z-grams. The class 
~ believes that, on balance t Z-grams have corrected many of the ills that could be 
immediately addressed. Now that the desired direction of movement is fully appreciated, 
it is important to continue to ensure individual commanding officer support of the 
spirit as well as the letter of intent by initiating policy changes directly and 
privately through the unit commanding officers. 
Finally, we believe that these problems can be solved within the Navy and can be 
done with available resources. Although deficiencies in material assets continue to 
be a significant factor in our overall Navy problems t increased attention to the 
human resource theme of recruit t satisfy, retain can help make our Navy efficient, 
effective, and combat ready. 
CALL FOR ASSISTANCE 
The call for an associate editor is repeated. A volunteer is needed who will help 
broaden the editorial base for the BAROMETER. A helping hand outside the Management area 
would be most valuable so that the BAROMETER can continue its attempt to remain a vehicle 
for professional comment covering material of interest and value for the entire NPS 
community. 
STUDENT COUNCIL NOTE 
Student Council delegates now provide student representation on the following NPS 
Boards and Councils: 
Bookstore Advisory Board 
Computer Council 
Facilities Planning Council 
Faculty Council 
Planning Council 
The NPS Computer Council has created a User Services Committee. A Student Council 
delegate is a permanent member of this new cpmmittee. Any student desiring to submit 
complaints, constructive criticism or suggestions to the Computer Councilor the Computer 
Center staff please contact: 
LT Bob Champoux 
SMC #1180 
Telephone: 373-5378 
